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Abstract
This article presents an econometric analysis of the many data on the sealed-bid
auction that sells mussels in Yerseke town, the Netherlands. The goals of this analy-
sis are obtaining insight into the important factors that determine the price of these
mussels, and quantifying the performance of an individual purchase manager. Be-
sides a case-study, the article is a general study on the role of auctions in supply
chains and hedonic price factors.
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1 Introduction
In a sealed-bid auction, all buyers simultaneously submit their sealed bids; in
case of a draw, the winner is the buyer who entered the highest price ￿rst
(details follow in Section 4). Auctions are an important research topic; see
recent publications such as Anandalingam and Raghavan (2005) and Katok
and Roth (2004).
Auctions create transparent markets by concentrating demand and supply. A
sealed-bid auction, however, provides bidders much less information on the
behavior of other bidders. But sealed-bid auctions are fast; e.g. the Yerseke
auction sells 30 lots in less than an hour (speed is essential because mussels
are highly perishable and many small lots are sold). Note that a single mussel











































































Fig. 1. Bullwhip e⁄ect in Dutch live-mussel supply chain
Furthermore, auctions (of whatever type) may play important roles in supply
chains. Figure 1 shows that the well-known ￿ bullwhip e⁄ect￿does occur in the
mussel supply chain.
Dutch mussels are an important product: annually, between 50 and 100 million
kilograms of raw mussels are delivered to the auction in Yerseke. Yerseke is the
only mussel auction in the world. Most Dutch mussels are exported, mainly
to Belgium and France.
In our case study, we address the following questions:
￿ Do auctions hurt big buyers; i.e., do companies that have big market shares
need to purchase large quantities at higher prices? (Big buyers of vegeta-
bles, fruit, and ￿ owers try to avoid auctions by pre-arranging prices with
suppliers; in our case study, however, Dutch mussels can be bought at the
auction in Yerseke only.)
￿ Does abundant supply decrease the auction price? The supply of products
such as mussels is subject to the whims of mother nature.
￿ Do prices vary with the time of the year? Lee et al. (1997) discusses the
bullwhip e⁄ect of seasonality. Indeed, in our case study the variation of
monthly auction sales exceeds that of monthly consumption. Figure 1 shows
data for ￿ live￿mussels, which are used for immediate consumption (whereas
￿ processed￿mussels are further treated in factories).
￿ Which factors determine the ￿ hedonic￿price? This price is the implicit price
of objectively measured characteristics of the product. The classic reference
on hedonic prices is Rosen (1974). There are publications on the hedonic
2prices of agricultural commodities such as cotton (Brown et al. 1995), wheat
(Espinosa and Goodwin 1991), Christmas trees (Davis 1993), and tuna ￿sh
(McConnell and Strand 2000).
￿ Do di⁄erent purchase managers get di⁄erent prices? If that is the case, their
companies should provide better training and decision support systems.
To answer these questions, we develop a linear regression model. We judi-
ciously select explanatory variables and transformations that improve the ￿t
of the model and make sense from the viewpoint of economic theory. To esti-
mate the regression parameters (or coe¢ cients) we use a database with mea-
surements on 28,017 mussel lots traded in Yerseke during the years 1986/1987
through 1999/2000. Our model also provides the input for a decision support
system (DSS) that we develop for the objective performance evaluation of a
given individual purchase manager (such a manager may spend several million
euros within an hour).
We have organized the remainder of this article as follows. In Section 2, we
formulate four economic hypotheses for the questions raised above. In Section
3, we give details on the Dutch mussel industry. In Section 4, we describe the
organization of the Yerseke mussel auction and the challenges faced by the
purchase managers who are active at this auction. In Section 5, we specify our
regression model, and discuss our data base and sample selection. In Section
6, we present the results of our estimated regression model, including tests of
our four hypotheses. In Section 7, we investigate the predictive (instead of the
explanatory) usage of our regression model. In Section 8 we develop a model
to assess the performance of a speci￿c purchase manager. In Section 9, we
present our conclusions and possible topics for future research. More details
about our study can be found in Van Schaik and Kleijnen (2007).
2 Four hypotheses
In this section, we formulate four hypotheses in the null form, as is standard in
mathematical statistics. Consequently, we reject these hypotheses only if there
is strong counter-evidence; i.e., the type-I error probability is only ￿ where we
select ￿ = 0:05. The alternative hypotheses simply negate the corresponding
null-hypotheses.
Common sense may suggest that a big buyer pays a lower price because of his
or her negotiating power. However, at a sealed-bid auction there is no bilateral
negotiating, so buying power carries no weight. On the contrary, we expect
that big buyers must bid higher to maintain their market shares. For example,
a buyer with a 20% market share has to submit bids that lead to success in
20% of the cases, whereas a buyer with a 10% market share must bid with
3only 10% success probability. This leads to the following null-hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: companies with higher market shares pay the same price (for
the same quality of mussels) as companies with lower market shares.
We also want to determine the price e⁄ect of total supply per ￿ mussel year￿ ,
which starts toward the end of June and ends in April of next year.
Hypothesis 2: mussel prices do not vary with total annual supply.
Many commodities show seasonal price behavior; examples of such commodi-
ties are heating oil and agricultural products. Such variations in demand or
supply cause volatile prices. If products can be stored for several months, fewer
products will be purchased when prices are high￿ which decreases the price
di⁄erences among months. In the Dutch mussel industry, supply and demand
result in much higher prices in June, July, and August. However, the vari-
able ￿ meat yield￿(which a⁄ects the hedonic price) is also higher in these three
months, so collinearity needs to be accounted for in our regression analysis.
Hypothesis 3: mussel prices do not vary with the time of the year.
A purchase manager has an important e⁄ect on his ￿rm￿ s performance. Unfor-
tunately, there is little systematic empirical evidence. We develop the following
three-step method to assess a purchase manager￿ s performance:
(i) Develop a theoretical price model, based on our regression model. This
model accounts for all objective characteristics of the mussel lot and the cir-
cumstances under which it is bought.
(ii) Calculate the di⁄erence between the theoretical and the actual prices.
(iii) Compare the premium paid by a particular purchase manager with the
premiums paid by other purchase managers.
Hypothesis 4: all purchase managers have the same performance level.
3 The Dutch mussel industry
Worldwide, the mussel industry is thriving￿ from Norway to South Africa and
from the United States to China. The major producing countries are Spain and
China. In the Netherlands, approximately eighty ships harvest and transport
mussels, cultivated on the seabed. Mussel ￿ farmers￿rent part of the bottom
of two North Sea estuaries in the Netherlands￿ namely the Wadden Sea (or
Dutch Shallows, from now on called Wadden) in the North of the country and
4the Eastern Scheldt (from now on called Scheldt) in the South-West￿ which
are a few hundred kilometers apart.
After the mussels have been transported to Yerseke and sold, they are placed
in special plots in the Scheldt. These plots serve as wet storage for this highly
perishable produce. From these plots, mussels are harvested on demand. There
are two types of demand: (i) live mussels and (ii) processed mussels. The former
type account for 84% of the mussels, on average. The live-mussel companies
clean, grade, and pack mussels. Their purchasing costs amount to approxi-
mately 60% of turnover. These mussels must have higher quality than the
processed mussels. The mussel-processing factories transform raw mussels into
either frozen mussels or mussel preserves. Their purchasing costs are approxi-
mately 40% of turnover, so more value is added to processed mussels than to
live mussels.
Actually, these percentages for live versus processed mussels vary from year
to year￿ according to the quality and quantity of supply. When supply is
abundant in a given mussel year, then prices are low and large quantities
are processed; e.g., in 1998 26% (instead of the usual 16%) was frozen and
preserved.
4 The Yerseke auction
The mussel farmers ship the mussels to Yerseke, a town on the Scheldt. The
farmers display their mussels in the harbor at the auction house￿ called the
House in this article. The House supplies a crucial service, namely quality
control. So￿ before the auction￿ employees of the House inspect the mussels
in the ships, and provide information on each lot￿ s quality to the purchase
managers.
All purchase managers are physically present at the auction, and simultane-
ously submit their sealed bids by entering a price on their individual keyboards
linked to a central computer. The House publicly announces the end of the
bidding time, and the computer then displays the price of the highest bid and
the name of the buying company. Details on the lower bids are not revealed.
In case of a draw, the winner is the buyer who entered the price ￿rst.
There is a minimum or reservation price that is ￿xed for one year; e.g., this
price was e 16 per ￿ mussel ton￿(100 kilograms) in 1999. If no buyer bids above
the minimum price, then the House buys the lot at that price. At the end of
the mussel year, the House auctions these mussels in the usual way. Actually,
only 1.6% of all the lots that we analyze was sold at this minimum price.
5All mussels supplied by a farmer in one ship are usually auctioned as one lot.
However, the House may decide to auction each of the two or three holds of
the ship as separate lots. In times of great price volatility, this practice might
spread the risk for the farmer. Indeed, lots appear at the auction in a random
sequence because there may be a drift in price setting during the auction
session (e.g., a buying frenzy may cause such a drift).
Note that the anomaly of di⁄erent prices for identical lots has been widely
investigated in the literature. For example, in a study of wine auctions, Gins-
burgh (1998) argues that it is unlikely that a bidder￿ s valuation would di⁄er
for identical lots of wine, saying that ￿ a rosØ is a rosØ is a rosØ￿ . Van den Berg
et al. (1999) investigates a ￿ ower auction, and assumes as well that ￿ a rose is
a rose is a rose￿ .
All eighty Dutch mussel farmers sell all their produce through the House.
Occasionally, the House also sells the produce of German mussel farmers. The
number of buyers varies slightly over the years, due to companies closing down,
starting up, or merging. There are on average twenty buyers for live mussels,
and four buyers for processed mussels. Sellers and buyers pay a fee to the
House, namely a percentage of their sales and an amount per mussel ton.
Lot sizes are measured in mussel tons. However, it is not practical to measure
the weight of an individual lot directly. Instead, it is assumed that seven tons
go into one cubic meter. The cubic capacity of a ship was carefully measured
when the ship was built. Hence, the content of a particular lot is determined
as a percentage of the ship￿ s full cubic capacity. The weight estimated in this
manner is the gross tonnage. The buyer pays only the net tonnage, which is
gross tonnage minus ￿ impurity￿ . Impurity consists of loose shells, star￿sh, dead
or damaged mussels, seed mussels (i.e., mussels shorter than 30 millimeter),
and other shell￿sh and crustaceans such as crabs. This impurity is measured
as a percentage of gross tonnage (impurity is an explanatory variable in our
regression model, as we shall see).
Altogether, the House collects the following data for the potential buyers:
meat yield, size count, impurity, barnacles, and slippers. The House does not
collect data on color, taste, and texture of mussels; the buyers themselves can
see the color, taste some mussels, and determine the texture. The variables
that are not measured by the House, plus any other variables that might a⁄ect
the price are represented by the ￿ noise￿or ￿ disturbance￿term in the regression
model (as we shall see).
A buyer faces the following problems at the auction. (i) A lot consists of a
great variety of mussels: some lots consist largely of small mussels, other lots
consist of large mussels, etc. So there are never lots of only one mussel size.
The consumer, however, is supplied with only ￿ve sizes of mussels￿ sorted
6according to shell width. (ii) Lots are auctioned sequentially, so the buyer
cannot simply optimize the combination of lots to be bought. The buyer must
wait to see whether his bid price turns out to be the highest price so he does
purchase that lot and realizes his desired market share.
The House computerized its process in 1986. Before an auction session starts,
the House compiles an information sheet about the lots. This sheet displays
the lot￿ s quantity, farmer, origin, and various quality indicators (see Table 1
below). After the auction session, the House completes this sheet by adding
the price per lot and the name of the highest bidder. This sheet is immediately
distributed to sellers and buyers.
5 Regression model speci￿cation
To determine hedonic prices, Rosen (1974) proposes linear regression analysis
with independent variables that a⁄ect this price. In general, such a model may
be written as
y = ￿0 +
k X
j=1
￿jxj + e: (1)
In our case study, the variable to be explained is the price per mussel ton (say)
p. In model (1), we use the dependent variable y = ln(p), for two reasons: (i)
The marginal e⁄ect @y = @ ln(p) = @p=p is the relative price change, so we
remove the scale e⁄ects caused by choosing a particular currency such as
euros or dollars. (ii) Some original explanatory variables zj are measured as
real numbers and for a subset of these variables we use their logarithm so
the explanatory variable becomes xj = ln(zj); for these explanatory variables
the regression parameter ￿j denotes the elasticity coe¢ cient (@p=p)=(@zj=zj),
which is popular in economic theory.
However, some original variables are measured as real numbers, and yet we
are not interested in their elasticity coe¢ cients. For example, for barnacles
(measured by z8; see Table 1) we wish to estimate the relative price change as
that variable changes by an absolute value:
ln(p) = ::: + ￿8z8 + ::: so (@p=p)=@z8 = ￿8 or @p=p = ￿8@z8:
Notice that there may be zero barnacles in a lot, so the logarithmic transfor-
mation would not apply anyhow. Actually, we studied various scatter plots to
decide whether logarithmic transformations provide a better-￿tting regression
model.
Some other variables are not measured as real numbers but are binary vari-
ables. For example, z11 equals 1 if the mussels originate in the Wadden, and
7Variable (subscript) Expected sign De￿nition
Price Price in Dutch guilders per mussel
ton of net tonnage
Market share (1) + Quantity bought by given buyer in
given mussel year
divided by quantity bought by all
buyers
Annual supply (2) - Total quantity for sale at the auc-
tion during one mussel year
Season (3) + Day of mussel year, starting at day
1 of mussel year
Buyer performance (4) 1 for purchase manager being as-
sessed; otherwise 0
Meat yield (5) + Percentage mussel meat in mussel
raw material.
Size count (6) - Number of mussels contained in 2.5
kg raw material
Impurity (7) - Everything that is not mussel, as a
percentage of gross tonnage
Barnacles (8) - Barnacles attached to mussels, in
grams per 2.5 kg raw material
Slippers (9) - Slippers attached to mussels, in
grams per 2.5 kg raw material
Usage (10) + 1 for live mussels; 0 processed mus-
sels
Origin (11) + 1 for Wadden mussels; 0 for Scheldt
mussels
Trend (12) + Year in which lot is o⁄ered for sale
Table 1
Regression variables, expected signs, and de￿nitions
0 if the mussels originate in the Scheldt. (Mathematically, ln0 is unde￿ned;
economically, an elasticity coe¢ cient for origin is nonsense.) The coe¢ cient of
a binary variable is the estimated percentage change in price when the lot has
the characteristic described by the binary variable while all other characteris-
tics are constant; e.g., Wadden mussels are ￿11 percent more expensive than
Scheldt mussels.
Table 1 provides the de￿nitions (and the predicted signs) of our regression
variables. We specify three types of explanatory variables:
8(i) For the variables market share, supply, season, meat yield, size count, and





if j = 1;2;3;5;6;7: (2)
(ii) For the variables barnacles, slippers, and trend we estimate relative price





if j = 8;9;12: (3)
(iii) For the three variables ￿ speci￿c buyer￿ , ￿ use as live mussel￿ , and ￿ origin￿ ,
we use binary variables. For example, for z11= 1 the regression model in (1)
gives lnp = ￿0 + ￿11 + ::: or p = exp(￿0 + ￿11 + :::), whereas z11 = 0 gives
lnp = ￿0 + ::: or p = exp(￿0 + :::) so the price ratio is exp(￿11). In general,




￿j ￿ 1 if j = 4;10;11: (4)
Finally, the term e in model (1) represents the noise caused by our exclusion
of some explanatory variables. For example, the House does not measure the
mussels￿color, taste, or texture; neither does the auction measure the po-
tential buyers￿utility functions. We assume that e is either white noise or
autocorrelated noise. White noise means that e is Normally, Independently,
and Identically Distributed (NIID); autocorrelated noise means that the inde-
pendence assumption does not hold.
In our regression model, we include most (but not all) of the information
that the House gives to the buyers, before the auction starts; i.e., we exclude
some of the House￿ s information. Our reason is that reducing the number of
independent regression variables increases prediction performance (also see
the Adjusted R2 in Section 6). So, we use size count but not shell width and
length, even though the latter two variables are displayed in the information
sheet that the House distributes to sellers and buyers.
Besides, the information supplied by the House to potential buyers, we include
some more independent regression variables, namely control or concomitant
variables. We distinguish four types of control variables:
￿ The following ￿ve variables control quality, so they a⁄ect the hedonic price.
Meat yield (z5): the consumer is interested in the amount of mussel meat.
The auction estimates this percentage from a sample from each lot.
Size count (z6): size count is determined by counting the number of mussels
9per 2.5 kilograms net. Because smaller mussels are cheaper, we expect that
a higher size count reduces the price; see the Expected Sign in Table 1.
Impurity (z7): we have already discussed impurity in Section 4.
Barnacles (z8): barnacles cause extra wear on the processing machines. The
buyers￿sorting machines categorize mussels according to shell width, so the
machines may erroneously categorize small mussels with barnacle growth as
large mussels. Barnacles also make mussels look less attractive to consumers.
Slippers (z9): slippers are animals that grow on mussels like barnacles do.
Slippers create the same problems as barnacles do.
￿ Product usage (z10) is a binary variable that denotes usage as either live
mussels or processed mussels. All lots are listed by the House in the order
of the ship￿ s arrival at the harbor. As we have already mentioned (Section
4), these lots are traded in a random order so mussels intended for either
live-mussel production or preserves are auctioned in a mixed order.
￿ Origin (z11) may be important because soil characteristics can a⁄ect the
￿ avor of mussels. In practice, the average price of Wadden mussels is higher.
However, these mussels also tend to be heavier (z6) and meatier (z5), so a
collinearity problem may arise. Origin measures whether Wadden mussels
generate a premium, even if we control for characteristics such as meat yield
and size count.
￿ The trend variable (z12) is measured such that, e.g., its value 86 denotes
the mussel year from June 1986 through April 1987. Besides seasonal price
movements (see z3), there has been an increasing price trend over the years.
Trend elements are in￿ ation in general and a considerable rise in the demand
for mussels without a noticeable increase in supply. This price increase has
mostly bene￿ted the mussel farmers, because the bottleneck in the supply
chain is the areas where mussel farmers cultivate mussels; live-mussel traders
and mussel-processing factories have excess capacity.
We obtain data on all the 30,303 lots traded at the House during 1986/1987-
1999/2000. Next, we remove a number of lots because they are not represen-
tative; i.e., some ￿shing and purchasing companies belong to the same group,
and trade produce at the auction at pre-arranged prices. Our correction re-
duces the number of lots to 28,017.
Not all variables have the same sample size. The variables z5 through z de-
termine the hedonic price, and are measured for each of the 28,017 lots; and
so is z4 (buyer performance) measured for each lot. Obviously, Supply (z7)
and Trend (z12) are measured per year, so we have only fourteen observa-
tions. Market share (z1) is measured per year and per buyer, so the number
of observations is approximately 14 ￿ 24 = 336. Season (z3) also has fewer
observations: we denote the ￿rst day of a speci￿c season by the integer 1, the
next day by 2, etc.
10Explanatory variable (j) OLS: c ￿j t(c ￿j) GLS: f ￿j t(f ￿j) Standardized: e ￿j
Constant (0) 6.9806 78.85 7.0785 59.08
Market share (1) 0.0421 17.81 0.0343 19.57 0.0795
Annual supply (2) -0.8396 -91.93 -0.8473 -49.65 -0.2127
Season (3) -0.1586 -78.56 -0.1474 -40.81 -0.1666
Meat yield (5) 0.8147 55.39 1.1046 76.07 0.3659
Size count (6) -0.8748 -85.92 -1.0526 -107.12 -0.4533
Impurity (7) -0.1412 -27.89 -0.1728 -43.08 -0.1784
Barnacles (8) -0.0005 -9.02 -0.0011 -24.66 -0.1063
Slippers (9) -0.0007 -6.31 -0.0003 -3.83 -0.0164
Usage (10) 0.1975 32.41 0.0916 19.19 0.0835
Origin (11) -0.0339 -6.16 -0.0581 -10.21 -0.0511
Trend (12) 0.0414 75.22 0.0418 40.19 0.1708
Durbin-Watson statistic 0.954 2.290




We compute our regression results through SPSS, version 9.0. In Table 2 the
second column shows the estimated regression coe¢ cients c ￿j in model (1) when
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). It is well-known that these estimates are
￿ best￿if the white-noise assumption holds; i.e., the c ￿j (j = 1;:::;k) are the
minimum-variance unbiased linear estimators. The interpretation of c ￿j varies
with the explanatory variable; see (2) through (4) (relative, absolute, binary
changes). We ￿rst estimate our model without the binary variable for buyer￿ s
performance (z4), because we wish to validate our model before we apply it
to test hypothesis 4 (purchase manager￿ s performance).
The table does not display \ cov(c ￿j; c ￿j0), the estimated covariances for the pair
j;j0 of estimated regression coe¢ cients (j;j0 = 1;:::;12). These covariances
are not zero, because some explanatory variables are correlated. The table
indirectly displays \ cov(c ￿j; c ￿j) = \ var(c ￿j), the estimated variances, because
the table does display Student￿ s t statistic, per regression coe¢ cient: t(c ￿j) =
11c ￿j=[ \ var(c ￿j))]1=2. All 12 t statistics are signi￿cant at any reasonable ￿ value,
even at ￿ = 0.001. One explanation is that the number of observations for
variables measured per lot is extremely high (namely, 28,017).
These t statistics, however, assume white noise, whereas the table displays
a Durbin-Watson statistic equal to 0.954 (see the next-to-last row), which
indicates positive autocorrelation. We therefore switch to Generalized Least
Squares (GLS), assuming the noise follows a ￿rst-order autoregressive process.
To compute the GLS estimates f ￿j, we use SPSS￿ s Prais-Winsten method. The
autocorrelation. coe¢ cient is estimated to be 0.5826 with a standard error of
0.0049 (not displayed). This GLS gives an acceptable Durbin-Watson statistic
of 2.290. The GLS estimates f ￿j are close to the OLS estimates c ￿j (both
estimators are unbiased, so they have the same expected value ￿j). Comparing
the t values for GLS and OLS shows that the GLS values are smaller for some
coe¢ cients, but not for all.
To compare the relative e⁄ects of the explanatory variables, we use the stan-









These f ￿j are displayed in the last column of the table. They suggest that
the most important variables are supply, size count, season, trend, and meat
weight; the least important variables are barnacles, origin, and slippers.
Last but not least, the overall explanatory power of the model is reasonable:
the Adjusted R2 is 66% for OLS and 56% for GLS (see last line of table). Other
regression models for hedonic prices gave only 37% for Christmas trees and
64% for tuna ￿sh￿ but 89% for wheat, and 93% for cotton; see the references
in Section 1. Switching from OLS to GLS decreases the Adjusted R2; never-
theless, GLS gives better predictions as we shall see in Section 7. Note that
R2 is a popular but possibly misleading statistic; see Kleijnen and De￿ andre
(2002) and Sutton (1990).
Now we return to testing the four hypotheses formulated in Section 2. Table
2 shows that market share (z1) has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on price; i.e.,
big buyers tend to bid high. So we reject Hypothesis 1 at the 0.001 level.
Supply (z2) has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect, which con￿rms the negative slope
of the demand function that is usually postulated in economic theory. Nev-
ertheless, we ￿nd the size of this e⁄ect surprising: the elasticity coe¢ cient is
-0.8.
12Season (z3) has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the mussel industry, so we reject Hy-
pothesis 3. Our interpretation is that the buying companies start the season
without any raw mussels in stock, so they quickly build stocks up to normal
working levels; apparently, in that short period of time (approximately six
weeks) supply cannot keep up with demand.
Buyer performance (z4) can be included as a binary variable that denotes
whether a particular manager buys a speci￿c lot (see again the de￿nitions in
Table 1). We can then test whether its regression coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. We reject Hypothesis 4 at the 0.001 level (not displayed
in Table 2). We shall further investigate buyer performance in Section 8.
The estimated e⁄ects of the control variables z5 through z10 show the expected
signs. And there is the expected long-term increase in price; see z12.
However, the e⁄ect of origin (z11) is signi￿cantly negative; i.e., our regression
model predicts that Wadden mussels are less expensive (see the de￿nition of
z11 in Table 1). In practice, Wadden mussels tend to be more expensive than
Scheldt mussels. Our model, however, also controls for quality and season,
measured by meat yield (z5) and size count (z6), on which Wadden mussels
generally outperform Scheldt mussels. In reality, after the period of reproduc-
tion (May and June), Wadden mussels reach the minimum quality require-
ments earlier. So, at the beginning of the mussel year￿ when demand is high
because companies want to build up stocks￿ most mussels sold are Wadden
mussels. However, buyers do not pay a higher price simply because mussels
originate from the Wadden: they pay a higher price for Wadden mussels be-
cause these mussels have better quality and many Wadden mussels are sold
at the very beginning of the mussel year when demand is high. Wadden prices
may actually be lower because of the larger distance between the Wadden and
Yerseke. Indeed, it may take a ship up to eighteen hours to travel this distance,
which shortens shelf life considerably: in hot weather, the journey may kill up
to 5% of the mussels on board the ship. We conclude that origin is important,
but in a way that violates our a priori expectation.
We also investigate the robustness of the preceding regression results, as fol-
lows. We estimate a new regression model for each of the fourteen years for
which we have data. We ￿nd that the individual regression estimates do not
change much over these fourteen years.
7 Predictive performance of regression model
In this section, we investigate the predictive performance of our regression
model. We therefore eliminate the most recent year (1999/2000) in our data
13base, and re-estimate our model from the subsample covering the remaining
thirteen years. We use this re-estimated model to predict the eliminated year;
i.e., we predict the price of the 2,199 lots auctioned during 1999/2000.
This prediction gives the following descriptive statistics for the actual and
predicted prices. The standard deviation of the predicted prices is lower and
the range is narrower. This smaller range results from a lower maximum price
and a higher minimum price. This minimum is slightly higher than the House￿ s
minimum price (described in Section 4). Our explanation is that our model
does not account for all variations that occur in practice; i.e., its Adjusted R2
is smaller than one.
When predicting the price of an individual lot, we account for autocorrelation.
So when the preceding lot has an actual price p that exceeded the estimated
price b p, then we increase our predicted price for the current lot (say) t with
t = 1;:::;2199:
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where the ￿rst two terms follow from (1) through (4) with xj;t denoting the
value of the explanatory variable j for lot t ; the remaining terms make the
weights of older prediction errors decrease geometrically, the sum of the geo-
metric weights being one. To explain this model, we consider the following
simple example: let￿ s assume that all past lots with important weights have
the same relative prediction error (say) 10%; we then increase our predic-
tion for the current lot by the same percentage. Notice that we quantify the
explanatory variable xj;t per lot, per season, or per year.
To derive the formula for the absolute price, we use the ￿rst two terms of the
equation above, combined with (1) through (4) and the GLS estimates in Table
2. The mean and the median of the predicted prices b p turn out to be higher
than the actual values p (obviously, E[ln(p)] 6= ln[E(p)]). The individual b pt
and pt give the following regression line:
ln(b p) = 1:559 + 0:675ln(p) (5)
with R2 = 0.54, computed from 2,199 lots. So the intercept is positive and the
slope is smaller than one￿ as is to be expected, even if the model is correct;





















































































































Fig. 2. Prediction accuracy of GLS with autocorrelation and OLS
For the non-transformed variables, (5) gives




The performance of our predictor improves considerably if we account for
autocorrelation.; see Figure 2, which displays the weekly averages of the actual
prices for GLS with autocorrelation. and OLS respectively.
Finally, we investigate whether our model is suitable for computer-supported
buying. An example would be: buy 20% of all lots to be auctioned in 1999/2000
(without intentional bias for any characteristic; i.e., the computer is not told to
15Explanatory E⁄ect f ￿j Overall Buyer mean Price di⁄erence @b p Relative price
variable (j) mean xj xjjz4 = 1 f ￿j[(xjjz4 = 1) ￿ xj] @b p=b p
Market share (1) 0.0343 1.8475 2.2161 0.0127 1.27%
Usage (10) 0.0916 0.8396 1.0000 0.0147 1.48%
Company characteristics 2.77%
Meat yield (5) 1.1046 3.2621 3.3183 0.0620 6.39%
Size count (6) -1.0526 4.9288 4.8902 0.0407 4.16%
Impurity (7) -0.1728 2.9815 2.8584 0.0213 2.15%
Barnacles (8) -0.0011 17.5835 15.6651 0.0020 0.20%
Slippers (9) -0.0003 6.7544 4.0686 0.0008 0.08%
Origin (11) -0.0581 0.4963 0.4808 0.0009 0.09%
Mussel quality 13.62%
Annual supply (2) -0.8473 4.4098 4.4369 -0.0230 -2.27%
Trend (12) 0.0418 92.6692 95.1552 0.1039 10.95%




Premium paid by buyer 6.12%
Table 3
Buyer performance assessment
purchase, say, meaty mussels). We compute that in the preceding period 1986
through 1998, the estimated 20% quantile of the di⁄erences between actual
prices and their predictions is -23.64. We therefore enter a bid equal to the
model￿ s predicted value minus 23.64. The computer turns out to buy 385 lots
(or 18%) of the 2,199 lots auctioned during 1999/2000, whereas a normally
distributed and unbiased estimator has a 50% chance of underestimating the
true value. So, our model needs only minor calibration to make it suitable as a
DSS for computer-assisted buying. Our model, however, ignores the in￿ uence
that such a DSS might have on its competitors￿bidding behavior.
168 Buyer performance
In this section, we develop a new tool for measuring the performance of an
individual purchase manager (also called a ￿ buyer￿ ). The ￿ bottom line￿question
is (see the bottom right-hand corner of Table 3): why did this manager pay
6.12% more than the predicted price?
We start with columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. These columns reproduce columns 2
and 4 of Table 2￿ but in a di⁄erent order, and inserting a few extra rows (e.g.,
￿ Company characteristics￿ ). These extra rows account for the characteristics
of this buyer￿ s company, his mussel quality, and his timing￿ as follows.
The ￿rst row of numbers shows that x1= ln(z1) = 1:8475. So, the price-
elasticity de￿nition in (2) implies b p = f ￿1 ln(z1) = 0:0343 ￿ 1:8475 = 0:06337.
The market share for this buyer gives x1 = ln(z1jz4 = 1) = ln(2:2161) = 0:7958.
Hence, the predicted price di⁄erence caused by market share di⁄erences is @b p
= f ￿1(ln(z1)￿ln(z1jz4 = 1) = 0:0343￿(1:8475￿2:2161) = ￿0:0127:This 0.0127
gives a price increase of exp(0.0127) ￿1 = 0.0127 = 1.27%. So, this manager
pays 1.27% more because he works for a large company.
The following rows can be explained analogously. For example, the next row
shows that this manager works for a company that uses live mussels instead
of processed mussels, which explains that he pays 1.48% more than average.
Further, he buys mussels of good quality and therefore pays 13.62% more than
average; we distinguish six quality characteristics, from meat yield to origin.
This manager bought when there was a good supply of mussels, and therefore
paid 2.27% less than average. However, he did not start in 1986, but only
when the trend had already increased prices: 10.95% price e⁄ect. He bought
early in the season when prices were 2.56% higher (live-mussel buyers cannot
wait as long as mussel-processing factories can).
All in all, this manager is expected to pay 29.86% more￿ given his company￿ s
characteristics, his mussel quality, and his timing.. Actually, he paid 37.81%
more. He should explain why he paid 6.12% more!
Note that this 6.12% is signi￿cant: if we add the explanatory variable z4 to the
GLS model in Table 2, then we ￿nd a regression coe¢ cient of 0.0939￿ which
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 0.001 level because t = 10.94.
Nevertheless, our assessment of this buyer is only tentative, for at least the
following two reasons.
￿ The GLS model has an Adjusted R2 of no more than 56% (see Table 2);
17only under the assumption of a perfectly valid regression model does the
statistical signi￿cance of f ￿4 hold.
￿ The buyer obtained high-quality mussels, which costs him 13.62% extra. On
one hand, this quality is justi￿ed if his company really needs this quality
to keep its customers satis￿ed. On the other hand, his company may be
shipping excellent mussels, whereas its customers are willing to pay for
average quality only. Indeed, for mussels (and other agricultural products)
customers do not always get exactly the quality they ordered. In this type
of business, the ability to deliver the exact quality ordered by customers is
probably a critical success factor.
We might re￿ne our analysis in Table 3, in which we compare the perfor-
mance of a speci￿c purchase manager with the mean performance of all the
purchase managers at the auction. For example, it might be more appropriate
to compare a particular manager who buys (say) live mussels, with the average
live-mussel buyer. In that case, we would estimate the regression coe¢ cients
for the more homogeneous subsample consisting of all live-mussel buyers ex-
cluding this particular manager. Similarly, we might compare the performance
of a manager of a large ￿rm with a subsample consisting of large ￿rms only.
In summary, whichever model we use to assess buyer performance, a particular
purchase manager might argue that the model is only an approximation of
reality. For example, he may pay more than his competitors because he buys
mussels that score better on characteristics not included in our model, such as
color, taste, and texture. Nevertheless, he would then have to explain why he
is willing to pay more for these characteristics and why he thinks his customers
are willing to pay for these characteristics while his competitors￿customers
are not. Ultimately, this manager￿ s justi￿cation would have to be judged by
professionals.
9 Conclusions and further research
In this article, we investigated the sealed-bid auction for mussels at Yerseke,
the Netherlands. We formulated four null-hypotheses that we based on ba-
sic economic theory. We rejected these hypotheses, and derived the following
conclusions:
￿ Large buyers pay higher prices (to maintain their market share?).
￿ The price/supply elasticity coe¢ cient is surprisingly high, namely -0.8.
￿ Season is important.
￿ Purchase managers perform signi￿cantly di⁄erently from each other.
18Moreover, whereas in practice Wadden mussels fetch higher prices, our model
suggested that these higher prices are not caused by the origin itself, but by
the concomitant quality characteristics and the season.
To derive these conclusions, we speci￿ed a linear regression model, includ-
ing double-logarithmic and single-logarithmic transformations and binary ex-
planatory variables. We estimated the regression coe¢ cients through data ex-
tracted from a database with 28,017 mussel lots. These estimated coe¢ cients
have the correct signs.
Moreover, we developed a new DSS for the objective measurement of the
performance of purchase managers. This DSS enables its users to ￿nd out
wether a speci￿c manager ￿ underperforms￿ ; i.e., in his e⁄orts to buy lots that
he thinks his company needs, he overshoots his target.
Further research is needed to remove the following limitations of our research.
￿ Only successful bids are included in our database; i.e., the data base does
not contain o⁄ers by all the other potential buyers who were outbid. This
limitation is typical of sealed-bid auctions.
￿ We concluded that big companies are at a disadvantage when making sealed
bids. Our conclusion may not be valid for other industries than the Dutch
mussel industry. Actually, all lots o⁄ered at the Yerseke auction are so small
that any bidder can a⁄ord to buy any single lot. However, in (for example)
the building industry, not all companies are large enough to carry out a
speci￿c large building project.
￿ Our model does incorporate most characteristics that are shown on the
House￿ s information sheet used by the potential buyers. However, future re-
search might also consider characteristics (such as color, taste, and texture)
that are not listed on this sheet.
￿ Other methods of statistical analysis might be applied; e.g., tobit analysis
(because of the censoring caused by the minimum price).
￿ Experimental economics and game theory provide di⁄erent methodologies
to study auctions.
￿ The requirements for the successful introduction of futures in mussels￿ in
addition to spot markets￿ are a challenging research topic.
￿ Our DSS for measuring buyer performance may be extended through a Data
Envelop Analysis (DEA), distinguishing between live and processed mussels,
and between small and large mussels.
￿ Prices vary during the day; e.g., prices may decline during the day, as buy-
ers realize their target purchase and withdraw from the marker during the
remainder of the day. These dynamics are not included in our regression
model.
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